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Abstract:  The major challenges facing the Europeans – such as terrorism, the migratory crisis, 
and differently “Brexit” as well as the rise of anti-European populism – call for the redesign 
and revival of the integration of a united Europe1. These various challenges should not be 
treated separately, in a fragmented manner but rather put in perspective and addressed in a 
structured way. They all bring into play the Europeans’ ability to rise together to overcome the 
series of crises they are facing. However unity cannot be taken for granted. Indeed extremely 
strong political tension is threatening the cohesion and stability of the European Union. 
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“in this interregnum monsters 
are born” in Quaderni dal carcere 
(quaderno 3), critical edition 
by the Gramsci Institute, Turin, 
1975, p. 311.
4. See Gérard Araud, « Le monde 
à la recherche d’un ordre », 
Esprit, August 2014.
5. Thierry Chopin, Jean-François 
Jamet, Christian Lequesne, 
L’Europe d’après, Paris, Lignes de 
repères, 2012. 
The way in which the Union was built, geared towards 
the goal of freedom of trade whilst limiting as far as 
possible the sharing of sovereignty, cannot provide 
Europeans with the protection they are expecting at 
present. The Pax Europaea, for which the European 
Union won the Nobel Prize is not a guarantee for social 
peace in the face of the economic crisis, for domestic 
security in the face of terrorism, or for the protection 
of the external borders. Unsurprisingly citizens turn to 
their States, even though they are often economically 
and politically weakened, because they still embody 
most of the Regalian functions and the protection of 
their citizens. However opinion polls show that it is 
regarding these issues that European citizens want 
more action on the part of the European Union.2
European integration seems therefore to be directly 
threatened: as a space without internal borders, 
it raises fears of contagion of the crises from the 
periphery (geographic and economic) to the heart of 
the Union, without being adequately equipped to rise 
to ensure a collective, Community wide response. The 
feeling of the Union’s inability to defend itself, except 
in the monetary area, places it opposite the models of 
other federations and confederations, where it is on the 
contrary the very foundation of collective identity and 
of the political legitimacy of common institutions. 
In this context this paper recalls the factors that have 
underpinned the unification of Europe to date and 
analyse the causes and implications of their collapse. 
It then seeks to identify the intellectual and practical 
conditions for a revival of the European project 
allowing it to rise to European expectations regarding 
the economy, security policy and the rule of law.
THE RISK OF FRAGMENTATION?
The weakening of the founding narratives. Peace, 
market and what next?
The features of the present European “crisis”3 are 
easily identifiable: economic uncertainty, institutional 
weakness and the lack of clear, effective, legitimate 
leadership, the rise of populist political forces, turmoil 
south of the Mediterranean, increasing religious 
fundamentalism, a growing number of challenges 
launched by the new world disorder4, and Europe’s 
uncertain position in the world’s new economic and 
geopolitical balance of power. Besides, the weakening 
of the narratives that legitimised European integration 
highlights the difficulty of reviving political ambition 
across the Union5. To understand the European crisis, 
the link between European integration and its founding 
narratives, whose influence is waning, needs to be 
recalled.
European integration was at first an effort of 
redemption after the collective suicide of two world 
wars and the sublimation of national political rivalries 
with the rejection of the logic of power which led to 
the stabilisation and pacification of the continent. In 
the process of unification the economy played a major 
role, particularly after the rejection of the European 
Community of Defence (ECD) in 1954 by France which 
had however been at its initiative. The economy was 
instrumental at first: in Robert Schuman’s project, “de 
facto solidarity” created by the internal market was 
meant to create joint economic interests to discourage 
the notion of « every man for himself » thereby helping 
 FONDATION ROBERT SCHUMAN / EUROPEAN ISSUE N°402 / 13TH SEPTEMBER 2016
2
The Future of Europe
to overcome nationalism. Under the aegis of NATO 
Europe’s discourse also influenced the mobilising role 
of the Soviet threat and the “sense of history”, that of 
the reunification of the continent. This period ended at 
the beginning of the 1990’s with the «end of history»6 
proclaimed after the collapse of the communist bloc.
A second period had in fact started slightly before this 
under the impetus of Jacques Delors with the support of 
Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand. After peace and 
unification, the idea was for prosperity and solidarity 
to guide European support to the project of Grand 
Europe. At the beginning of the 1990’s after peace and 
reconciliation the economy was no longer instrumental 
and became the focus of European discourse, with the 
Single Market – the biggest market in the world – and 
the euro as its structuring elements. The results are 
there to be seen: never in its history has Europe been 
as free and as wealthy, because never has Europe been 
so free of the rationale of internal power struggles. 
Europe owes this situation largely to the progress of 
integration. However this rationale ran aground with 
the financial and economic crisis and the social and 
political consequences that have gone with it.
The change of national visions
European integration has historically been the 
product of a combination of different factors of 
internal – reconciliation, pacification, democratisation, 
economic integration – and external unification – Cold 
War, the Suez Crisis, decolonisation, the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the end of the USSR, reunification of Germany 
– together with national political rationale, with each 
Member State conveying interests and a specific vision 
of its contribution to European integration. We know the 
famous phrase of Zbigniew Brzezinski: “Via European 
integration, France is aiming for reincarnation, Germany 
redemption.”7. For its part the UK and the countries in 
the North of Europe (which show some reservations 
with regard to European integration) have traditionally 
targeted the “optimisation” of their national interests 
in a “utilitarian” rationale of calculating sovereignty 
“costs and benefits”8. For their part the countries 
of Southern as well as those in Central and Eastern 
Europe  have followed a rationale of “sublimation”, i.e. 
the rapid transformation from one political (dictatorial) 
and economic (shortage economy) state to another 
((liberal democracy and market economy). In spite 
of the heterogeneous nature of this political rationale 
the European Union is the result of a meeting point 
and negotiated compromise of different viewpoints. 
However for the last few years now these national 
views have evolved.
Is Germany’s rationale still one of redemption? 
Some observers say that Germany “is no longer 
European”9; would it not be more exact to say that 
it has “normalised”?10 Reunified Germany is now the 
continent’s leading economic power and the centre 
of a widened Union. These developments comprise a 
real change for the dynamics of integration that must 
be taken into account. At the same time German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, during the euro zone crisis, 
whilst defending the interests of German taxpayers, 
finally admitted that the euro’s failure would be that of 
Europe and that there was still congruence therefore 
between national interests and those of Europe. 
Moreover, although Germany’s economic results 
facilitate the assertion of its model and of its national 
interests in a completely uninhibited manner, the 
rationale of redemption still seems to be at work in 
the diplomatic and military spheres, as shown by the 
hesitation then divergence between the government 
and the German public opinion regarding military 
intervention in Syria and in the management of the 
refugee crisis11.
France has blown hot and cold for a long time. It 
was behind ambitious projects of integration and has 
also often been extremely reticent about these very 
same projects12 : the ECD in 1954, the Empty Chair 
crisis in 1965, the European Constitution in 2005 
and the most recent example – European economic 
governance. Generally French diplomacy prefers the 
intergovernmental method. Within public opinion 
there is reticence about the federal idea of European 
democracy in that this means the possibility of “French 
ideas” (interventionist economic policy, a strong civil 
service, mistrust with regard to liberalism, Social 
Europe and also Powerful Europe) being in the minority 
in the European debate13. This was one of the lessons 
of the French “no” to the European Constitution in 
2005. Over the last 10 years the situation in France 
has weakened further from the political, economic 
6. See Francis Fukuyama, The 
End of History and the Last Man 
(1992). 
7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand 
Chessboard: American Primacy 
and its Geostrategic Imperatives 
(1997). Cf. also Michel Foucher, 
La République européenne, Paris, 
Belin, 2000, pp. 66-68.
8. See Juan Diez Medrano, 
Framing Europe: Attitudes to 
European Integration in Germany, 
Spain and the United Kingdom, 
Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 2003 and Yves Bertoncini 
and Thierry Chopin, Politique 
européenne. Etats, pouvoirs et 
citoyens de l’UE, Paris, Presses 
de Sciences Po-Dalloz, 2010, pp. 
66-78.
9. See for example Wolfgang 
Proissl, “Why Germany fell out 
of love with Europe?”, Bruegel 
Essay, 2010.
10. Cf. Simon Bulmer, Germany 
in Europe: from “tamed power” to 
normalized power”, International 
Affairs, 86/5, 2010, pp. 1051-
1073 ; see also Pierre Hassner, 
“L’Allemagne est-elle un pays 
normal ?”, in Commentaire, 
n°129, Spring 2010, pp. 119-123.
11. On a specifically military 
note see Christian Lequesne, 
« L’Allemagne et la puissance en 
Europe », in Revue d’Allemagne 
et des pays de langue allemande, 
vol. 47, n° 1, 2015, pp. 5-13.
12. See Thierry Chopin, France-
Europe : le bal des hypocrites, 
Paris, Editions Saint-Simon, 2008
13. See Christian Lequesne, La 
France dans la nouvelle Europe, 
Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 
2008.
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and social point of view, which has influenced the 
rise of Euroscepticism both in the political class and 
also amongst French public opinion14. In a context 
like this it seems that France no longer believes in its 
reincarnation within an enlarged, federal, free-market 
Union, in which it no longer identifies and seems to be 
seeking a new European narrative15. 
Does the rationale of “sublimation” still typify the 
countries of Southern Europe – in a context in which 
Europe is seen as “imposing” austerity policies that are 
deemed illegitimate from the outside (in Portugal, the 
new term “troicado” - from “Troika” - means “to be 
cheated”) and is no longer considered as a solution 
to political/institutional dysfunction like corruption16 (in 
Greece) and also illegal immigration (in Italy). For their 
part the same applies to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe in a context in which nationalist reality 
and aspirations have made a comeback, sometimes 
taking the shape of an authoritarian national populism, 
as is the case in Hungary?17 These developments are 
structuring the future development of the European 
Union and a new compromise has to be defined on 
these new foundations if we want to consolidate and 
strengthen European unity in the face of the challenges 
being thrown at them. 
The economy is no longer necessarily a unifying factor
Although the markets are no longer forecasting the 
collapse of the euro zone, due to the action taken by 
Member States and the European Central Bank (ECB), 
its situation is still worrying. From an economic point 
of view it is clear that the crisis and its consequences, 
both economic/financial and social, have to be taken 
seriously, particularly the decrease in investments 
and its implications for growth potential, high 
unemployment, notably amongst the young people in 
some Member States, the decline in purchasing power, 
an increase in poverty and rising inequalities. From 
a political point of view, the crisis has widened the 
North/South divide of Europe18, which is visible both 
in terms of expectations and representation. Germany 
and the countries Northern Europe, expect the States 
in the South to show their ability to grow without 
accumulating public and private debt and to undertake 
structural reforms tackling in particular tax evasion, 
corruption and corporatism. For their part the countries 
of Southern Europe that have been weakened by the 
debt crisis, hope for stronger financial solidarity on the 
part of their partners in exchange for their commitment 
to greater responsibility, notably in terms of managing 
government finance and undertaking reforms. 
Of course with the crisis, fundamental debates over the 
future of European integration have been raised and 
work to complete the euro zone has been undertaken. 
In order to recover their sovereignty in the face of 
the markets and therefore the ability to decide over 
their future Member States, notably those in the euro 
zone, have understood that they have to consolidate 
the Economic and Monetary Union. Financial solidarity 
mechanisms have been introduced and the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) has entered into force; 
stricter common rules have been adopted in terms 
of the budget and economic governance mechanisms 
have been strengthened (“six-pack”, “the budgetary 
pack”, “two-pack”) ; and the Banking Union 
project has moved forward, conferring the tasks of 
supervising banks upon the ECB, as well as creating a 
joint mechanism for the resolution of banking crises, 
ahead of the possible creation of a single deposit 
guarantee system. 
However there is still disagreement between Member 
States regarding economic, financial and fiscal union, 
notably about European interference in national 
decisions and the timeliness of increased solidarity (for 
example a credible, backstop for the Single Resolution 
Fund for bank crises, a single deposit guarantee 
system and a euro zone budget taking the shape 
of an investment capacity or common employment 
insurance). In addition to this the challenge made 
to the legitimacy of European decisions demands 
steps being made towards Political Union19. But in the 
present political climate, marked by rising populism, 
as well as extremist, anti-European parties, most 
heads of State and government deem that this context 
is politically unfavourable to an ambitious reform, 
considered to be politically risky, of the European 
Union and the euro zone. 
This is especially so since, although the danger of 
fragmentation has been overcome in the euro zone, 
we cannot be sure that the economy will continue to 
14. The Eurobarometer surveys 
show that in 1973, 1 French 
person in 20 believed that 
belonging to the EEC was a 
bad thing; in 2010 the ratio 
was 1 in 4. Moreover in 2008 
the economic crisis increased 
Euroscepticism within the 
population: French mistrust of 
the European Union increased 
by 23 points between 2007 
and 2013.
15. Olivier Rozenberg, “France 
in quest of a new European 
narrative”, European Issue, 
n°345, Robert Schuman 
Foundation, February 2015.
16. See the work of Ignacio 
Sanchez-Cuenca, “The Political 
Basis of Support for European 
Integration”, in European 
Union Politics, 1 (2), 2000; pp. 
147-171. The argument is as 
follows: there is said to be a 
positive correlation between 
the degree of corruption in a 
country and the level of support 
of public opinion in belonging to 
the EU (the more the country 
is perceived to be corrupt, 
the more its citizens support 
belonging to the EU.
17. Jacques Rupnik, « Le vent 
mauvais du populisme est-
européen », Telos, November 
2006
18. The crises of the last 
five years have fostered the 
development of dangerous 
tensions and divisions between 
the peoples of Europe notably 
when they lead to divisions 
like for example that between 
the North and the South in 
the euro zone crisis, with the 
resurgence of preconceptions 
and sometimes scandalous 
stereotypes.
19. See Sylvie Goulard &Mario 
Monti, De la démocratie en 
Europe. Voir plus loin, Paris, 
Flammarion, 2012.
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play a unifying role that it had been assigned since 
the start of European integration. This rationale did in 
fact collapse with the financial and economic crisis and 
its social consequences. Moreover, the euro zone crisis 
highlighted the deep economic and political divergence 
that has appeared over the last few years between the 
Member States, notably between Germany and France. 
One of the lessons learnt in the Greek crisis and from 
the risk of a “Grexit” has been that the economy is no 
longer a unifying but dividing factor, becoming an area 
for the expression of national political power struggles. 
The dynamic of economic integration, although 
necessary, does not necessarily go hand in hand with 
an increase in cooperation between Member States. 
Likewise, economic interdependence does go hand 
in hand with a return of power struggles. Finally the 
rationale of competitiveness and competition may in 
some cases coincide with the return of national passions 
and the question has been raised about whether the 
equation of trade as a factor of peace is still valid or 
not20. As stated by Pierre Hassner globalisation has 
tended to “morph into mistrust and hostility”21. 
The populist challenge and the threat of national 
divisions
The electoral rise of populism and the nationalist far 
right is a political fact of primary importance22, although 
this should not necessarily lead us to overestimate 
their political weight at European Union level for the 
time being23. The spread of the discourse backed 
by these political parties and the ensuing erosion of 
the fundamental principles, which form the heart of 
the European project are leading to a real danger of 
national withdrawal within the Member States. In spite 
of their diversity these political forces all disseminate 
an anti-European discourse that weighs over the 
political agenda and public debate in many States, 
notably in, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Hungary 
and Austria, and in Scandinavia. To a certain degree 
some countries seem to be protected from this due 
to their memory of authoritarian regimes. Southern 
Europe is for instance experiencing the effects of the 
far right to a lesser degree, probably because of the 
still vivid memory of the suffering from dictatorships. 
Thus the phenomenon of political memory also has to 
be taken into consideration. However several examples 
(Greece) seem to show that this memory is not a 
sufficient guarantee.  
In this context, on the one hand the sovereignists, who 
tend towards nationalism, develop a defensive, closed 
vision of European national societies and advocate the 
closure of the borders to immigration and the restriction 
of free movement; on the other, the anti-liberals deem 
that European integration is occurring according to 
a neo-liberal economic ideology, which is leading to 
the dismantling of national social systems and must 
therefore be countered in virtue of this; finally some 
combine these two approaches in what might be called 
“left wing sovereignty”24. The electoral rise of populism 
– both on the left and the right – just like the rise of the 
far right nationalists constitutes a real danger regarding 
the re-nationalisation of European policy. Beyond the 
development of types of national-populism25, this re-
nationalisation can take very different shapes and 
affect the European Union to different degrees: the 
attempt by national decision making bodies to control 
decisions taken at European level, whose democratic 
legitimacy is challenged for example in Germany; the 
desire on the part of some Member States - starting 
with the UK – to redefine the terms of their relationship 
with the European Union; finally the development of 
secessionist movements within some Member States 
(Catalonia, Scotland, etc.).
Moreover the repeated crises that have affected 
Europe over the last five years have had significant 
repercussions on relations between Member States: 
Franco-German discord; the North-South divide; 
the UK’s status; East-West fracture over the refugee 
crisis26. In the face of the terrorist attacks in Paris, 
Brussels, Nice, and in Germany, there have been many 
calls for solidarity and unity but it is to be feared that 
these new tragedies will increase not only divisions 
within national societies but also between the States. 
The issue of the presence of jihadists amongst the 
groups of asylum seekers has already affected the 
debate over immigration. The area between the front 
line countries, which are being accused (notably 
Greece) of lax attitudes and the countries of Central 
Europe, which denounce the dangers of multi-cultural 
societies is full of pitfalls. The question of security 
policies cannot be ignored either: the failure of national 
20.  See Philippe Martin, Thierry 
Mayer, Mathias Thoering, « La 
mondialisation est-elle un 
facteur de paix ? », in Daniel 
Cohen & Philippe Askenazy 
(dir.), 27 questions d’économie 
contemporaine, Paris, Albin 
Michel, 2008, pp. 89-123.
21.  Pierre Hassner, La revanche 
des passions. Métamorphoses de 
la violence et crises du politique, 
Paris, Fayard, 2015, introduction.
22. Cécile Leconte, Understanding 
Euroscepticism, Palgrave, 
Macmillan, 2010. 
23. See Nathalie Brack, « Radical 
and Populist Eurosceptic Parties 
at the 2014 European Elections: A 
Storm in a Teacup? », The Polish 
Quarterly of International Affairs, 
n°2, 2015, pp. 7-17. 
24. Dominique Reynié, Le vertige 
social-nationaliste, Paris, La Table 
Ronde, 2005. See also Daphne 
Halikiopoulou, Kyriani Nanou, 
Sofia Vasilopoulou, “The paradox 
of nationalism: the common 
denominator of radical right 
and radical left Euroscepticism”, 
European Journal of Political 
Research, 51, 2012, pp. 504-539 
and D. Halikiopoulou “Radical 
left-wing Euroscepticism in the 
2014 elections: a cross-European 
comparison”, in Is Europe afraid 
of Europe? An Assessment of 
the result of the 2014 European 
Elections, Wilfried Martens Centre 
for European Studies / Karamanlis 
Foundation, Brussels / Athens, 
2014.
25. See Pascal Perrineau (dir.), 
Les croisés de la société fermée. 
L’Europe des extrêmes droites, La 
Tour d’Aigues, Editions de l’Aube, 
2001. The expression “open 
society” is borrowed from Karl 
Popper, «The Open Society and 
its enemies »(1945)
26. See Jacques Rupnik, 
« L’Europe du Centre-Est 
à la lumière de la crise des 
migrants », Telos, 28 September 
2015 ; and Lukas Macek, 
« Refugee Crisis : a new 
«East-West» split in Europe ? », 
European Interview, n°88, Robert 
Schuman Foundation, 26 October 
2015.
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security services has been emphasised (Belgium being 
the focus of criticism). In short, the return of the 
national glacis with the border as the only legitimate 
protection may still gain ground. In this context mutual 
mistrust can but grow and the Schengen area is under 
unprecedented pressure with the return of national 
border controls and the building of walls and security 
fences between Member States27.
Hence the project to unify Europe is in danger: if 
European leaders do not implement reform that will 
help them remedy these present shortfalls, European 
opening will give way to national withdrawal. However 
there is little chance that this withdrawal would 
provide more solutions rather than further problems. 
In particular renationalisation would not solve 
phenomenon that are beyond the national level: they 
would not stop migrant flows, they would not solve 
economic weaknesses, they would not make politics 
more ethical, they would not bring terrorist threats to 
an end. What is at stake is rather more the definition 
of the content of policies and the lines of division on 
this point run through national debate. Finally national 
withdrawal would not remedy European disagreements, 
on the contrary. Acrimony with regard to Brussels 
would change to bitterness regarding neighbouring 
European States, which would assume the role of the 
scapegoat they had before European integration began 
and which still rises to the surface from time to time. 
A return to a national Europe would be a return to a 
history of political division that European integration 
has not made disappear but which has succeeded in 
neutralising with checks and balances. 
REVIVING WORK TOWARDS A UNITED EUROPE
The status quo: an illusory choice. The paralysis of 
European “governance”
Faced with political divergence, the choice of a 
consolidated status quo might appear tempting from 
a short term perspective, since it seems that there are 
too many obstacles for the European Union to overcome 
the lack of any common vision of the future of Europe. 
This situation has prevailed since the Maastricht Treaty, 
which provided the Union with its most recent major 
structuring projects, the internal market and the euro. 
The reasons for the difficulty in defining a medium 
to long term political project for Europe have now 
been pinpointed28: a lack of European leadership, the 
strengthening of intergovernmentalism29, a tendency 
to fall back on national interests in a doubled edged 
context of increased international competition and of an 
unprecedented crisis since the Great Depression, and 
the threat of an ageing Europe remaining paralysed in 
a “catatonic state”. In this context it would be tempting 
to give up, with a focus on consolidating the Union in 
its current form.
However this would be a mistake and the status quo 
is not a viable option long term30. If there is one thing 
that has been learned from the repeated crises that 
the Europeans have had to face it is that European 
“governance” has shown its limits both from the point 
of view of its efficacy and of its legitimacy. The gulf 
between the way the European institutions function 
at present and the needs evidenced by the crises is 
increasingly obvious. Diplomatic negotiation time is too 
long and the feeling has progressively developed that 
Europe is always one step behind the crisis. Moreover 
this mode of functioning is the cause of great anxiety: 
the negotiations’ outcome is always uncertain, the 
positions adopted by the different governments seem 
to be regularly subject to electoral calendars, their 
decisions at European level can then be challenged at 
national level, especially in a context in which many 
governments have been sorely weakened politically 
in their own country. The ensuing uncertainty 
increases citizens’ anxiety. Lastly the present “crisis 
management” methods, which notably give primacy 
to the European Council, lead to a problem of clarity 
and legitimacy for the citizens of Europe, since there 
is a lack of a real European democratic debate. Indeed 
a common political mandate is irreconcilable with 
the juxtaposition of 28 national political mandates. 
As stressed by Benoît Coeuré, “The raison d’être of 
this (intergovernmental) approach is, admittedly, to 
allow each government to sign up to shared decisions. 
However, experience shows that it does not ensure 
that governments take ownership of those decisions 
at national level. What is more, it does not prevent 
the polarisation of the debate at European level or the 
temptation to engage in nationalist posturing.”31 Finally 
this approach is not even satisfactory from a national 
27. Yves Pascouau, «The 
Schengen Area and the crises : 
the temptation of reinstalling 
the borders » in T. Chopin and 
M. Foucher (eds.), Schuman 
Report on’Europe. State of the 
Union 2016, Paris, Lignes de 
repères, 2016. 
28. Cf. Christian Lequesne, 
« L’Union européenne après le 
traité de Lisbonne : diagnostic 
d’une crise », in Questions 
internationales, n°45, La 
documentation française, 
September/October 2010. 
29. See Chris Bickerton (ed.) 
The New Intergovernmentalism: 
States and Supranational 
Institutions in the Post-
Maastricht Era, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2015.
30. Cf. Thierry Chopin and 
Jean-François Jamet, “Europe 
and the Crisis: what scenarios 
are there? Collapse, status 
quo or continued integration”, 
European Issue Robert 
Schuman Foundation, n°219, 
November 2011.
31. Benoît Cœuré, member 
of the ECB’s Executive Board 
“Drawing lessons from the crisis 
for the future of the euro area”, 
speech at the French Foreign 
Affairs Ministry on the occasion 
of the Ambassadors Conference, 
27 August 2015.
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point of view since politicians cannot commit in the 
domestic democratic debate on a new orientation of 
European policies since at the end of the day, the 
decision will be the result of a diplomatic negotiation 
with other heads of State and government. 
All of this has a political and economic cost. The 
populist and extremist parties are on the rise in Europe, 
criticising the weaknesses of democracy, especially at 
European level, as they reject the present political and 
economic system. In fine this is leading to a general 
feeling that the status quo is increasingly difficult to 
maintain and that it will not last for long.
After the Brexit: redefining relations between the two 
Europes
On 23rd June 2016 a majority of British citizens 
chose for their country to leave the European Union. 
Following this decision, one thing is certain: Brexit 
is bad for the Union. Beyond the economic, political 
and strategic amputation that this represents for 
the EU, the programmed exit of the UK is symbolic 
of disunion, in a context in which the Union and its 
States absolutely need unity and cohesion if they are 
to rise to the multiple crises that are now affecting it. 
It formalises a moment of political “dis-integration”32, 
thereby creating a precedent which all of the europhobic 
parties for example in the Netherlands, France and 
Italy are trying to exploit. However it is still too early 
to say whether the British withdrawal will serve as a 
model or not.
In addition to this the referendum outcome has 
thrown the UK into the unknown and into protracted 
negotiations over the terms of separation and 
of its future relations with the European Union33. 
In this situation the governments of Europe have 
two legitimate priorities: avoiding giving the 
UK a preferential status, and at the same time 
finding a solution and settlement to overcome the 
economic and political uncertainty resulting from 
the decision of the UK to leave the EU. Looking 
forwards, the time has however come to rethink 
the European architecture because the Brexit, just 
like the consecutive crises before it, make it vital 
to rationalise and clarify the different levels of 
integration in Europe34.
The terms of the debate are starting to emerge in the 
UK. On the one hand the moderate “remainers” and 
the “leavers” want to protect the Kingdom’s political 
stability as far as possible: their priority is to remain 
as closely linked to the Union as possible, notably 
guaranteeing access to the Single Market. On the other 
hand the supporters of a more radical break want to 
prioritize controlling immigration, sovereignism, and 
also asserting the UK’s vocation in the world which 
European regulations are said to be constraining. In the 
eyes of this group the apparent contradiction between 
isolationist and globalist temptations do in fact reflect 
the desire to turn the UK into a « grand Switzerland » 
open to foreign capital and competitive but controlling 
immigration and exempt of unwanted European rules. 
Amongst the various possible options35, two are often 
mentioned: the “Norwegian” model in which the 
UK would join the European Economic Area (EEA); 
the “Swiss” option with the negotiation of bilateral 
agreements between the UK and the EU. But none 
of these different options is deemed fully satisfactory 
by the British government36. In the Norwegian model 
the UK would continue to take part in the internal 
market but would then lose a major share of its ability 
to influence the rules of the internal market since it 
would no longer take part in the approval of these. In 
the Swiss model it would in addition lose full access to 
the internal market, in particular as regards financial 
services which play a key role in the British economy, 
and the Scottish and Northern Irish issues would not 
be resolved easily. 
Although the EEA options and the Swiss model do not 
seem possible for the UK as matter stand right now 
the country might explore the possibility of a revision 
of the EEA’s rules so that equal voting rights might be 
granted to States which comprises non EU members 
(like Norway) regarding the policies in which they 
participate, notably those involving the Single Market37. 
A settlement like this would offer the British a 
compromise, allowing them to avoid a brutal break 
from the European Union and its economic and political 
costs. The UK would indeed continue to participate in 
the Single Market and to implement the corresponding 
rules, which it would still continue to help define. It would 
of course have to contribute to the Union’s budget but 
only for certain policies (it would no longer participate 
32. Cf. Douglas Webber, ‘How 
likely is it that the European 
Union will disintegrate? A 
critical analysis of competing 
theoretical perspectives’, 
European Journal of 
International Relations, 
20(2), 2014, pp. 341-365; 
Douglas Webber, European 
Disintegration? The European 
Union in Crisis (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, to be 
published,
33. Treaty on the European 
Union, art. 50.
34. Cf. Thierry Chopin et Jean-
François Jamet, « Le Brexit : la 
tension entre les deux Europe », 
La Vie des idées, 23 juin 2016.
35. Jean-Claude Piris, “Should 
the UK withdraw from the EU: 
legal aspects and effects of 
possible options”, European 
Issue, n°355, Robert Schuman 
Foundation, October 2015.
36. Alternatives to membership: 
possible models for the United 
Kingdom outside the European 
Union, HM Government, March 
2016.
37. Cf. Thierry Chopin et 
Jean-François Jamet, “After the 
British referendum: redefining 
relations between the two 
Europes”, Question d’Europe, 
n°399, Robert Schuman 
Foundation, July 2016.
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in the Common Agricultural Policy for example). 
Finally the freedom of movement would continue to 
apply but an EEA-wide compromise may be sought 
on common measures to govern labour mobility and 
the EEA Agreement already provides for the possibility 
of temporary, proportionate safeguard measures that 
might be activated unilaterally38. In return, a reform of 
the EEA should ensure that legislation of EEA relevance 
enters into force simultaneously in all EEA Member 
States to avoid delays observed in the past. Likewise, 
the interpretation and enforcement of the common 
legislation should be entrusted to common institutions. 
This arrangement might tempt other countries inside 
and outside the EU but it would preserve a high degree 
of integration. It might also lead to a clarification 
and ultimately lead to a realignment of the EMU with 
the European Union, whilst the EEA would offer the 
institutional framework for the Single Market.39 From 
this standpoint the integration of the euro zone would 
no longer require the creation of ad hoc structures. 
This scenario is of course hypothetical, but it suggests 
that fundamentally the Brexit could lead to redesigning 
the way the “two Europes” i.e. the euro zone and the 
single market, might function together.
 
Reviving European ambition
Eight years after the start of the crisis the European 
Union must of course strengthen its internal cohesion 
and notably continue the integration of the euro zone. 
It is incidentally the recommendation made by the 
report “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
Union” prepared by European Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker in close collaboration with the 
Presidents of the European Council, the Eurogroup, 
the ECB and the European Parliament. This report 
acknowledges that for the euro zone to more than 
just “survive”, for it to “prosper”, it is vital to share 
European sovereignty within the common institutions 
based on adequately strong mechanisms of political 
legitimacy and accountability. Although this goal is 
necessary there is doubt that the need to strengthen 
EMU would be enough to make significant progress 
in terms of political integration. The opposite may in 
fact apply. The euro was first a political choice: it is 
in fact the political will to protect this common good 
and common institutions empowered to protect it 
(particularly the ECB and the ESM) that prevented the 
collapse of the euro zone. This political will and these 
common institutions are backed by strong support on 
the part of public opinion for the euro: more than two 
thirds (69%) of Europeans support the euro, with only 
one quarter being against it (25%), with 6 % giving 
no opinion.40 The origin of this support is economic in 
part (protection against currency crises for example) 
but it is also geopolitical: the euro is the most concrete 
symbol of a united Europe. Hence it has become a 
constituent element of European identity and reflects 
the pooling of common interests in the global game.
If we follow this logic then the long term redefinition 
of the European political project is urgent. The rise of 
radical, populist and even extremist, Eurosceptic or 
Europhobic trends – both on the left and the right brings 
to light a crisis in European liberal democracy both from 
an economic and political point of view41. Deregulation 
has been linked to the disaster of the financial crisis 
and tax scandals (LuxLeaks for example). Moreover 
political liberalism is increasingly seen as a synonym 
for impotence, notably in the face of other models that 
are being put forward in the world: fascination mixed 
with fear regarding the Chinese model; attraction 
towards the Russian regime on the radical left and 
right. The liberal crisis is reflected in the political crisis 
of which the revival of populism and extremism in 
many European States is a sufficiently clear symptom. 
The strength of liberal democracy is however that it is 
a regime that is naturally open to its own inadequacies 
and shortfalls. In the face of the crisis of democratic 
legitimacy, the fundamental challenge is to produce a 
common vision of the future of European integration to 
give it a clear purpose: a community of citizens does 
not just live by the law, the economy and regulations; 
it also lives according to a feeling of belonging to a 
political community as an area of choice. In the face of 
the economic crisis the proponents of an “open society” 
must admit that the quest for equality and solidarity 
(which led to socialism) just as the demand for 
economic and social protection in a free-trade world are 
fundamental human requirements. These aspirations 
were illustrated by the success of Thomas Piketty’s 
book on inequality42 and are just as legitimate as are 
aspirations to freedom. Likewise, in the face of the 
38. Article 112 of the EEA 
Agreement.
39. 26 Member States have 
committed to adopting the 
single currency when they fulfil 
the required conditions in virtue 
of article 3.4 of the Treaty, only 
two States, Denmark and the 
United Kingdom are exempted 
but they are exceptions and not 
the rule. Moreover Denmark has 
pegged its currency alongside 
the euro and aligns its monetary 
policy with that of the euro 
zone.
40.  Eurobarometer Standard 
83, May 2015. Question QA18.1
41. On this point we might refer 
to the various contributions 
published in the review 
Commentaire: Abram N. 
Shulsky, « La démocratie 
libérale : victorieuse et 
assaillie », n°148, Winter 2014-
2015 ; special article on « Le 
libéralisme politique. Victoire 
ou défaite ? », n°142, Summer 
2013 ; Pierre Manent, « La crise 
du libéralisme », n° 141, Spring 
2013 ; Thierry Chopin and 
Jean-François Jamet, « L’Europe 
libérale en question », n°134, 
Summer 2011.
42. Thomas Piketty, Le capital 
au XXIe siècle, Paris, Le Seuil, 
2013.
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refugee crisis the reception of people fleeing countries 
at war is a moral imperative and a fundamental right; 
at the same time the quest for security must equally 
be taken into account. In the same way the freedom 
of movement and establishment within the internal 
market are the Union’s fundamental principles but they 
must not lead to a situation in which the provision of 
a service in the same place obeys different social and 
tax rules. The history of the previous century shows 
that if citizens’ demands and aspirations are not taken 
seriously there is a danger that they will be taken in 
hand by radical, anti-European political forces43.
It thus appears vital to redesign European liberalism 
with the cardinal aim of protecting citizens against the 
excesses or inadequacies of political and economic 
systems. And this must be based on the critical 
acknowledgement of the limits of the organisational 
principles on which our societies are based, in particular 
the State and the market, freedom and security. In 
other words it means rejecting the ideological belief in 
the supposed identity of one of these principles alone 
with the general interest.
From an economic point of view European liberalism 
must acknowledge the limits both of the market and 
the State. It is clear that it is impossible to trust the 
market blindly: it can be self-referential in the short 
term (it is better to be wrong with the others than 
to be right alone), and experience brutal changes. 
Moreover, state intervention can be justified by 
externalities, the asymmetry of information, the need 
to compensate initial inequalities for reasons of social 
justice or the necessary definition of rules to ensure the 
good functioning of institutions such as the financial 
markets, the currency, and competition. At the same 
time it has to be acknowledged that State intervention 
is not omniscient or omnipotent and that it does not 
reflect individual preferences (and incentives) as 
effectively as a decentralised price system. It is also 
potentially open to risks such, as political clientelism, 
the capture of regulators by interest groups, nepotism 
and corruption. These dangers have fed criticism of 
the elites and fostered the rise of populism in many 
European countries.
Similarly from a political point of view, it is important 
to acknowledge the respective limits of the demands 
for security, freedom and identity. Each one of these 
is legitimate to a certain extent. But wanting absolute 
security, wanting to erase uncertainty or risk is eminently 
dangerous for freedom because freedom means a 
certain amount of indeterminacy, which is incompatible 
with the total control of citizens’ actions. The demand 
for security can therefore never be absolute because 
this would lead to a closed, authoritarian society. 
Conversely freedom is not effectively possible without 
the minimum degree of security, which is safety, i.e. 
the fact of not seeing one’s physical integrity under 
threat or subject to the arbitrary good will of the 
other, and without at least a minimal amount of social 
protection. By reformulating Rawls’ first principle of 
social justice44, we might say that our societies’ goals 
should be to ensure the greatest security and freedom 
of individuals that is compatible with an extensive, 
constitutionally protected set of fundamental civil 
liberties and safety guarantees. This principle justifies 
State intervention as part of its regalian tasks that aim 
to protect civil liberties and, in their name, security 
whether this involves domestic or foreign security. 
But although the European Union has a certain 
number tools to ensure the good functioning of the 
markets (notably via it prerogatives in the areas of 
competition, internal market regulation and monetary 
policy), its weaknesses have to be acknowledged in 
several regalian areas because the Member States 
do not want to grant it power in these areas. In 
particular its ability to contribute to the stabilisation of 
economic cycles in the budgetary domain, or its role in 
maintaining security and the rule of law (for example 
the fight against corruption, counter-terrorism, or 
the defence and protection of the Union’s borders), is 
very limited. As a consequence Europe’s institutions 
have found themselves ill equipped in the face of the 
economic crisis and with regard to the request for a 
strengthening of the rule of law and security policies. 
It is not surprising then that many protest parties are 
just as critical of Europe’s work as they are of national 
policies.
The ideas above are a rough outline for a European 
project that would guarantee citizens greater protection. 
For example, since terrorism is a transnational threat 
launched against Europeans, the Member States 
should pool resources in the shape of greater police 
and intelligence cooperation, in justice matters and 
43. See Pierre Hassner, 
« L’Europe et le spectre des 
nationalismes », Esprit, October 
1991 ; referred to in La violence 
et la paix, Paris, Le Seuil, 1995 ; 
Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting 
Democracy: Political Ideas in 
Twentieth Century Europe, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 
2011.
44. John Rawls, A Therory of 
Justice, The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1971.
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with regard to defence by reviving Strategic Europe45. 
Recent proposals aiming to strengthen Frontex are a 
good example of the measures that should be taken 
and implemented; developing integrated border 
management covering a wider field of players (coast 
guards and customs officers); moving over to a system 
– no longer acting on behalf of the States when they 
wish to call on its services but on behalf of the Union and 
in the interest of the smooth running of the Schengen 
Area – able to intervene at the Union’s borders without 
the need for unanimous prior authorisation by Member 
States involved. Another concrete example to ensure 
the joint fight against terrorism, but also corruption and 
other forms of crime, would be to create a European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office. This is already possible with 
the current treaties (article 86 of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the EU) which also provide the possibility 
for a limited set of States to take the initiative if the 
others are at first reticent. This type of initiative would 
help remedy the feeling many citizens have that Europe 
is “an open, unprotected area.”
Standing together to face external challenges
This political project also needs an external 
dimension, which is too often and incorrectly 
disconnected from imperatives of internal 
cohesion. Reviving the European project supposes 
the provision of answers to the following: “What 
are Europe’s collective goals? What are the public 
goods that require joint action? Obviously, the scope 
of such reflection goes beyond just the economic 
sphere; it also encompasses key determinants of 
power, such as technology, energy, foreign policy 
and security. In federations, public investment in 
such common goods is centralised. Here in the 
European Union, we are a long way from that. And 
yet, we face the same international challenges.”46. 
Political union between States involves an 
agreement over the issue of war and peace and 
in fine a minimum amount of unity in terms of 
foreign policy, at least between the States which 
count in these areas. The pooling of competences 
by the Member States in terms of foreign policy is 
in fact a focal point of any process towards political 
union. Overcoming divisions between Member 
States requires the revival of a debate over true 
political union, which should lead to the discussion 
of new pooling of sovereignty or at least new ways 
of exercising some regalian prerogatives together. 
For several centuries power has been associated 
with State sovereignty. This results from three 
sovereignty levers: diplomacy, defence and the 
police. Diplomacy and war are par excellence the 
business of the State, the heart of sovereignty, 
the expression of the “Westphalian” functioning 
of international relations. As shown by military 
intervention by France in Syria and Africa, the 
tension between Russia and Turkey and the 
developments in Iranian policy, the Westphalian 
grid of analysis has not lost its relevance, however 
in a globalised world the individual power of EU 
Member States seems to be eroding and the need 
for unity to protect their interests and influence 
the global agenda is more vital than ever before47.
However the idea of sovereignty is problematic 
in European affairs: the Union is not a State 
and other administrative levels are the focus 
of distributional conflicts. In this context the 
definition of the Union’s task is not extremely clear 
to the citizen, who might wonder how his political 
rights work in a system that is highly influenced by 
bureaucratic/diplomatic factors. Moreover if there 
is one area in which Europeans agree to grant the 
State with a role, it is in terms of regalian tasks 
(budgetary decision, foreign policy, defence, 
immigration, police, protection of security, energy 
independence). But the European Union was built 
on the refusal to entrust the Union with regalian 
tasks to protect their own sovereignty. The Union 
has been granted tasks of redistribution (Common 
Agricultural Policy, Cohesion Policy) which cause 
conflict over appropriation. In a globalised world 
it would seem logical for the Union to have 
regalian instruments. In reality it depends on the 
constitution of a European identity and Political 
Union. 
Whether indeed we speak of radical Islamic 
terrorism, political changes in Maghreb and the 
Middle East, repeated tension with Russia, notably 
regarding Ukraine or the consequences of the 
now “relative” power of the USA, Europeans are 
45. Nicole Gnesotto, 
Faut-il enterrer la défense 
européenne ?, Paris, La 
documentation française, 
2014 and by the same author 
L’Europe a-t-elle un avenir 
stratégique ?, Paris, Armand 
Colin, 2011.
46. Benoît Coeuré, member 
of the ECB’s executive board, 
“Drawing the lessons from the 
crisis for the future of the euro 
zone.” op cit
47. See Maxime Lefebvre, La 
politique étrangère européenne, 
Paris, PUF, 2016
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facing an accelerated worsening of their collective 
security. Moreover the regulation of migratory 
flows, the fight against climate change, the 
strengthening of energy supply security and the 
fight to counter inequality and poverty, notably in 
the countries of Africa, are all international issues 
in which European action is confronted with global 
challenges. The European narrative focused for 
half a century on the economy and introversion. 
Now we have to provide it with the political and 
external extension for the coming decades, with 
a view to involve Member States and citizens 
in new common projects. The Union must turn 
towards the world which is changing rapidly and 
adapt to the world’s evolving balance of power48. 
This supposes that the Union will adopt a change 
in perspective in terms of its place in globalisation 
both from an economic and strategic point of 
view. Too often the European Union does not think 
strategically and in doing so prevents itself from 
enjoying greater influence in the international 
arena as it restricts itself to a technical approach 
that is often useful, sometimes effective but rarely 
decisive. It is accustomed to the deliberation of 
the “forum”, and indeed membership of the Union 
has pacified the relations between Member States; 
it must now defend its values and interests in the 
“arena” 49 of international politics. The challenges 
that the Europeans now face are vast since the 
ingredients that have helped towards their peace 
and prosperity are being questioned. To be both 
real and sustainable the revival of the European 
integration project needs to be given a clear 
political horizon with a strong sense of purpose and 
a renewed narrative.
For the European Union “the most decisive aspect 
is undoubtedly of vital essence: its internal 
dynamism, its ability to adapt without betrayal, 
innovating whilst agreeing to open its doors, to 
debate and cooperate with others without losing its 
identity (…). But the thing that is lacking is a dose 
of vital energy, self-confidence, ambition and on 
the other hand awareness of its unity. If passions 
are being released elsewhere, the Europeans 
are not passionate about their common project. 
Passions exist at national level, but they often tend 
to be defensive and negative. A European ambition 
has to be either created or revived.”50
***
Given the sharing of common regalian prerogatives 
that this political project implies, debate over the 
European Union’s political dimension must be 
taken up once more. Indeed although the crises 
that are affecting Europeans should help set the 
terms of debate over true political union and 
over the issue of the Union’s political regime, the 
continuation of Europe’s integration cannot content 
itself with moving forward at a forced pace, out 
of necessity alone. A project like this must be 
undertaken according to a previously set design 
and with adequate political legitimation. If we 
want to give European policy a sense of purpose, 
we must remedy this lack of “backbone” without 
undue delay and dare to debate publicly the content 
that should be given to the future direction of the 
European project.
This debate should clearly contrast three choices:
Firstly that defended by those tempted by the return 
of “old Europe” and national withdrawal. A scenario 
like this might seem tempting to many citizens who 
express the legitimate expectation of protection, 
since it gives them the feeling that sovereignty has 
been recovered in terms of regalian choices and 
security as part of a political framework deemed 
more “natural” and more protective: the nation 
state. However this option is incredibly risky both 
economically and politically with the perspective of 
a fragmented, divided, weakened Europe.
Then there is that of the status quo, at best the 
consolidation of the Union following the various 
shocks that have been affecting it, but without 
reforming the whole. It would be a mistake, since 
the status quo is not a sustainable option long term 
and it would therefore be illusory to content oneself 
with the consolidation of our acquis. History has 
shown that, in a crisis context, a political system 
can end up disappearing by fear of reforming itself. 
Finally there is that of the supporters of a Union of 
nation States that is open to the world: in the face 
of the “malaise” felt by many Europeans a long 
48. See Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, 
Quand l’Europe s’éveillera, Paris, 
Grasset, 2011.
49. See Michel Foucher, “The 
European System in the world 
and the real world in Europe. A 
dual test” in Schuman Report on 
Europe. State of the Union 2016, 
op. cit. ; by the same author 
L’Europe et l’avenir du monde, 
Paris, Odile Jacob, 2009.
50. Pierre Hassner «Préface » 
in P. Esper (et al) « Un monde 
sans Europe ? » Paris, Fayard / 
Economic Defence Council, 2011, 
pp. 29-30.
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term intellectual and political project is necessary 
for 21st century Europe, if we do not want our 
societies to close to the modern world. This project 
must be that of rebuilding a political, economic 
and social model that is specifically European 
– reconciling freedom, solidarity, values that form 
our common identity, security and international 
influence – to make it “competitive” in the world 
competition of civilisation models and political and 
economic systems.
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